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Abstract
Nationalism is useful in consolidating state identity and bolstering state-building,
but in the form of ethnic nationalism, it can undermine the integrity of the state. This
paper examines the effect of non-Russian and Russian nationalism in the former Soviet
Union. It finds that although Russian nationalism evokes more fear outside Russia than
non-Russian nationalism, the violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union have been
caused by the latter rather than the former. Non-Russian nationalism also threatens the
integrity of the Russian Federation. The author concludes that although the Soviet
Union was unique, the political use of nationalism anywhere following rapid change
and economic dislocation can rapidly turn nationalism from a positive means of self-
identification to a virulent ethnic exclusion of others which leads to conflict.
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the disintegration of the
last European empire in  1991,  the size  of  the international  system has
grown at an unprecedented rate. While some of the new members are old
established states that have regained their sovereignty and independence, a
considerable  number  are  newly created entities  that  have never  before
experienced independent statehood. Political leaders have made active and
instrumental use of nationalism both in countries that have re-established
their  independence,  and  in  new  states.  This  is  a  perfectly  natural  --
perhaps,  even  a  necessary  --  phenomenon.  Nationalism  is  useful  to
establish  (or  re-establish)  the  identity  of  a  state,  to  consolidate  that
identity, and to separate the state from other states so as to bolster the
process of state-building. But nationalism must be used carefully if it is to
remain  positive. If  it  takes the form of  ethnic nationalism,  it  can be a
divisive force in a multi-national state. And it can undermine the integrity
of  the  state  when  it  is  manifested  by  national  minorities  that  feel
threatened by the way in which the political elites of the dominant nation
attempt to exclude them. 
In the new, post-Cold War international system there are a number of
cases  where  the  viability  of  a  state  is  threatened  by  the  demands  of
national  minorities  for  their  own  independent  sovereign  statehood.
Moreover, demands for autonomy appear to be infectious, spreading from
new states  to old,  the struggle  for  Abkhazian independence seemingly
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related to calls for, say, a separate Scottish parliament. Furthermore, in
both new states and old, there appears  to be a revival  of  an exclusive
nationalism  that  aspires  at  best  to  prohibit  certain  groups  from  full
participation in the political and economic life of the state and at worst to
exclude them from the state or  from life  itself.  As a result,  the much
heralded  ‘new  world  order’  has  been  disorderly,  conflict-ridden  and
violent in many new states, and the constitutional order of some old states
appears to be under threat. Dealing with the rise of nationalism, the drive
for  autonomy and the demands  for  national  separatism are  among  the
greatest  challenges  that  politicians  and  analysts  will  face  in  the  21st
century.
Nowhere is  this  process  more alarming than in  the former Soviet
Union, where more than one hundred and twenty nationalities live in close
proximity,  often  geographically  inseparable  from  one  another.  In  a
number of cases, nationalism has already led to violent conflict. In others,
the continued existence of an integrated state appears to be at risk. This
paper will concentrate, therefore, on the rise and effect of nationalism in
the  former  Soviet  Union.  It  will  begin  with  a  brief  overview of  the
different  perceptions  of  non-Russians  and  Russians  when  the  former
Soviet Union disintegrated. It will then examine the rise of non-Russian
and Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union, before turning to the effect
that nationalism has on the international relations between former Soviet
republics and on their relations with the external world. The final section
of the paper will consider whether the rise of nationalism in the former
Soviet Union has wider implications for the 21st century. It will conclude
that whether nationalism in the former Soviet space is  the result of  the
unique conditions of democratization and the transition from socialism, or
whether  it  is  a  sign  of  a  more  general  international  problem,  it  will
constitute a challenge which will need to be met into the 21st century.
2. Non-Russian  and  Russian  perceptions  of  the
disintegration of the Soviet Union
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, most of its
non-Russian  citizens  acclaimed  the  simultaneous  destruction  of  two
empires, the Soviet and the Russian. They had little reason to regret the
passing  of  either.  Although their  more immediate concern  was to free
themselves  from  the  shackles  of  the  USSR,  many  of  them  had  been
colonized well before the revolution in October 1917 and they had bitter
memories of the Russian empire as well as of the Soviet Union. When the
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  was established in  1922 the  brief
independence that some of them had enjoyed after the October revolution
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ended and there was no  doubt in  their  minds that the impetus  for  the
formation of the USSR came from Russia.1 
In any case, to non-Russians, Soviet power seemed indistinguishable
from Russian power. The highest positions in the Soviet government and
the apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were
held predominantly by Slavs, and particularly by Russians. Many Russians
who  lived  in  the  other  fourteen  republics  of  the  USSR were  skilled
workers  or  political  functionaries.  They  seemed,  therefore,  to  enjoy
privileged status and to be relatively affluent. The Russian language, as
both  the  lingua  franca  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  language  of  the
political elite, dominated over other languages. Anyone with professional
or political ambition had to master Russian. As far as non-Russians were
concerned, therefore, there was irrefutable evidence that the Russians were
the ruling nation in the Soviet Union. Non-Russians blamed Russians for
their  own inferior  status within the Soviet Union and for  their lack of
freedom. As a result, when they declared sovereignty and independence
before and after the abortive coup in August 1991,  most of  them were
proclaiming their liberation both from the USSR and from Russia. 
Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  celebrated the  collapse  of  only  one
empire  when  the  USSR disintegrated,  and  that  empire  was  the  Soviet
Union.  Most  Russians  believed (and they still  believe) that Russia  had
been  exploited  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  they  had  suffered
disproportionally under Stalinism. They certainly did not hold themselves
responsible for the crimes and injustices of Soviet socialism. Neither did
they identify themselves with the rulers of the prerevolutionary Russian
empire. On the other hand, they did not, as a rule, think that Russia had
exploited  its  colonies.  On  the  contrary,  like  many  other  former
imperialists,  Russians  believed  that  Russian  imperialism  had  been  a
uniquely benign and civilizing phenomenon. And although they did not
consciously  wish  to  recreate  the  Russian  empire,  they  were  used  to
thinking of Russia as a vast country which included non-Russian areas. As
a result, they soon began to regret the disappearance of the Russian empire
that had preceded the Soviet Union. Russian attitudes to the end of  the
Soviet and Russian empires are, therefore, based on perceptions that are
very different from those of the majority of non-Russians.
Russian  and  non-Russian  nationalism  interacted  with,  and
exacerbated, one another to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Moreover, the interaction did not end when the USSR ceased to
exist;  the two kinds  of  nationalism continue to influence one another.
1  The independence of the Baltic states lasted until their annexation by the Soviet Union on the
eve of the Great Patriotic War. Bessarabia, which had been captured by Romania in 1918, and
Western  Ukraine  and  Western  Byelorussia,  which  were  ceded  to  Poland  in  1920,  were
reincorporated into the USSR at the end of the Second World War.
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Non-Russian  nationalism  is,  in  part  at  least,  aggravated  by  Russian
nationalism. Russian nationalism and the problem of Russian identity are,
in turn, a response to non-Russian nationalism.  Before examining how
this  interaction  affects  the  relations  between  Russia  and  the  other
successor  states,  it  might  be  useful  to  consider  separately  how  non-
Russian and Russian nationalism originated and developed.
3. The  origins  and  development  of  non-Russian
nationalism
Nationalism was the precipitating cause of the collapse of the Soviet
Union. But contrary to present conventional wisdom, it had only recently
become  a  disintegrative  force.  Although  there  were  manifestations  of
nationalism within the USSR, and particularly in  those areas that were
incorporated into the Soviet state during and after the Second World War,
they occurred relatively infrequently and were easily suppressed. After the
1950s, however, little coercion was required. The CPSU was an effective
centralising and unifying force. It was only well after Gorbachev began to
introduce economic and political reforms that nationalism became a threat
to  the  integrity  of  the  state.  Indeed,  the  first  serious  indications  that
nationalism might become an intractable problem occurred between two
of the nations that formed the USSR (Armenia and Azerbaijan), not in
clashes between the central government and the governments of the titular
nations  of  the  fifteen  republics  which  eventually  dissolved  the  Soviet
Union.
The constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted
in 1924, was federal in form, if not in substance. In theory those units of
the federation known as ‘union republics’ (there were fifteen of them in
the  1980s)  had  the  right  to  secede  from  the  USSR,  although  the
constitution offered no guidance as to how this right could be exercised.
The delegates in one of the two chambers of the legislative assembly, the
Council  of  Nationalities,  represented  national  entities  (irrespective  of
consciousness of national identity) in proportion to the size and ascribed
status of the national group. The ‘Stalin’ constitution that replaced it in
1936 was similarly, to use Stalin’s own depiction, ‘national in form but
socialist  in  content’.  In  other  words,  the  republics  constituting  the
federation had virtually no political or economic power. The Soviet Union
was  highly  centralized  in  the  way that  it  functioned  and  all  effective
political  power  was  held  by  the  hierarchical,  tightly  organized  and
centralized CPSU. 
Although  the  Soviet  Union  was  federal  in  name  only,  the
representation of national minorities in the central government encouraged
a sense of national identity. Other aspects of Soviet policy had the same
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effect.  For  example,  administrative  divisions  in  the  country  were,
wherever possible, on the basis of nationality. As a result, within some of
the  fifteen  republics  there  were  both  non-nationally  delineated
administrative  districts  and  regions  (where  there  was  no  discernible
national  minority)  and  ‘autonomous  republics’,  ‘autonomous  areas’  or
‘national  areas’  (the  exact  title  depended  on  the  size  and  geographic
distribution  of  the  eponymous  national  group).  Although  they did not
enjoy any real autonomy, a sense of separateness and difference on the
basis of nationality was inculcated in the people who lived in these areas.
The  Soviet  style  of  government,  which  was  to  co-opt  local  elites  to
represent  central  government,  and  to  train  national  cadres  for  local
government, similarly fostered a sense of separateness. Consciousness of
ethnic identity was enhanced by the Soviet policy of supporting national
cultures,  providing  a  written  language  where  necessary,  funding  the
publication of national literature and providing primary education, at the
very least, in the local language. Paradoxically, therefore, and despite its
avowed internationalist ideology and its strictly centralized system, Soviet
rule ‘genuinely promot[ed] and encourag[ed] national  consciousness  of
diverse ethnic groups’ (Mirsky, 1997: 2), creating nations in cases where
there had previously been little more than a sense of  clan identity (for
example, among Abkhazians, Khirghiz). At the same time, the aspirations
of  established  nations  (for  example,  Estonians,  Armenians)  remained
unfulfilled.
These constitutional arrangements have had serious consequences in
the  post-Soviet  period.  On  the  one  hand,  the  governments  of  newly
independent states, invariably composed almost entirely of  members of
the dominant nation, have attempted to create integrated unitary states by
abolishing the nominally autonomous status of areas within their borders.
This is what happened in Georgia and Azerbaijan, for example. On the
other  hand,  ‘matryoshka’ nationalism  has  become  a  common
phenomenon.2 In  other words,  the political  elites  of  the nations  which
previously  enjoyed quasi-autonomy (for  example,  the  Abkhazians  and
South Ossetians in Georgia, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh) have
either  demanded  full  sovereignty  and  independence  from  the  state  in
which they are located, or have aspired to be part of a different state (the
Russian  Federation,  in  the  case  of  Abkhazians  and  South  Ossetians;
Armenia, in the case of Nagorno-Karabagh). But even when autonomous
status  has  been  enhanced by a  new post-Soviet  constitution,  as  in  the
Russian  Federation,  some  national  groups  have  demanded even  more
autonomy  (for  example,  Tartarstan),  or  complete  independence  (for
2 The term comes from the wooden Russian doll (called a matryoshka) which, when




The negative and destructive aspects of the Soviet system, and most
particularly  of  Stalinism,  served  to  consolidate  the  sense  of  group  or
national  identity  established  by  the  constitutional  arrangements,  the
administrative  divisions,  and  the  government  practices  of  the  Soviet
Union. The political elites of the territories incorporated into the Soviet
Union  during  and  after  the  Second  World  War  were  executed  or
disappeared into the labour camps of  Siberia.  Stalin  became convinced
during  the  war that  various  national  groups  had cooperated (or  would
collaborate) with the occupying German forces. He deported the groups he
suspected  and  abolished  their  autonomous  republics.  The  Meskhetian
Turks in Georgia, the Tartars in Crimea and Germans in the Volga region
were removed en masse to Central Asia. The Karachai autonomous area
and the autonomous republic of  Chechnya-Ingushetia disappeared from
the map  of  the North  Caucasus  during  the  war,  while  the  Kabardino-
Balkar  autonomous  republic  was  transformed  into  the  Kabardin
autonomous republic.3 
During  destalinization  Nikita  Khrushchev exonerated  most  of  the
deported peoples  and  some  of  them were  permitted to  return  to  their
historical  homelands.  The  autonomous  republics which had disappeared
were resurrected.4 However, in some cases their borders were not identical
with those which had existed before the deportations. The Karachai, for
example, were now united with the Cherkess in an autonomous republic
and, although Chechen-Ingushetia was re-established, some of its former
territory  remained  in  Ossetia.  Moreover,  on  their  return  home,  the
deported people frequently found that other people had been settled on
their lands and in their homes. In some cases they now constituted the
minority  population,  although  the  area  still  bore  their  name.  Thus
Khrushchev’s rehabilitation of the deported peoples further enhanced the
sense  of  shared suffering  inflicted by the  terrors  of  Stalinism.  It  also
created  the  conditions  for  conflict  during  the  last  few  years  of  the
existence  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  post-Soviet  period,  when
territorial claims and counter-claims began to be made and rejected, and
when  attempts  to  redress  the  population  imbalance  resulted  in  ‘ethnic
cleansing’. A sense of grievance against those (usually Russians) who had
settled in the territories of deported peoples, sometimes against their will,
is a further legacy of both Stalinism and of Khrushchev’s attempt to make
amends for it.
3 For an early account of these events, see Conquest (1972).
4 Not all  deportees  were granted the right  of  return,  however. The Meskhetians
remained in Uzbekistan, while the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans only received the right
to return home or to recover their confiscated property much later.
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It is clear, therefore, that the Soviet authorities practised contradictory
policies,  fostering  national  consciousness  on  the one hand, and, at  the
same time, repressing national minorities. The irony, however, is that the
effects of these policies were only fully realized as a result of Gorbachev’s
reforms.  The introduction of  perestroika in  1985 unleashed wave after
wave  of  nationalism.  One  aspect  of  the  policy  of  glasnost’ was  the
encouragement of  the dissemination of  a more accurate account of  the
history of  the Soviet  Union  than  had previously been admissible.  The
recovery of the past fuelled a sense of shared identity among groups which
had suffered  at  the  hands  of  Soviet  power.  Glasnost’ also  legitimized
criticism and permitted freedom of expression. National grievances began
to  be  aired.  When  democratization  allowed the  emergence  of  a  more
pluralist,  less  centralized political  system, political  groups  began to be
formed for the first time since 1917. In a vast majority of cases they were
organized on the basis of national identity and, in promoting nationalist
issues, they soon began to challenge local communist authorities. In the
period  preceding  the  disintegration  of  the  Soviet  Union  nationalism
became so  popular  that any political  leader (including,  in  many cases,
local communist leaders) wishing to gain local  support had to espouse
nationalist  sentiments. Some of  them, particularly in areas incorporated
into the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War, began to
adopt secessionist platforms.5 
Secessionist  tendencies were not, however, confined to the largest,
established nations  after  which  the  union  republics  of  the  USSR were
named.6 All  fifteen  union  republics  were  multinational,  and  many
contained national minorities intent either on improving their status, or on
gaining their own separate independence. The national assertiveness of the
minorities within the fifteen new states established by the disintegration of
the Soviet Union undermined the authority of the governments elected to
steer them through the difficult transition to democracy and independent
statehood. 
Non-Russian  nationalism  undoubtedly strengthened the  centrifugal
forces which caused the USSR to dissolve. But the primary cause of the
disintegration of the country was the nationalism of Russia, the largest,
dominant  nation,  rather  than  the  determination  of  smaller  nations  to
secede from the Soviet Union. Let us, therefore, turn now to the origins
5 Georgia was the one exception to this generalization. Although the republic was
incorporated into the group or USSR when the Union was formed, its nationalist government
was amongst the first to demand full independence. 
6 It is important to stress that nationalism and the drive for secession were by no
means  uniform  throughout  the  fifteen  republics  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Some  republican




and development of Russian nationalism.
4. The  origins  and development  of  Russian  nationalism
and the Russian identity problem
While some of  the fifteen republics would certainly have declared
independence once the new confederal treaty proposed by Gorbachev in
1991  made  it  possible,  the  entire  USSR  would  probably  not  have
disintegrated if Russia itself had not declared sovereignty in 1990 and had
not ceased paying into the central budget in 1991. Boris Yeltsin and his
followers used Russian nationalism in their struggle against Gorbachev
and the central Soviet authorities.7 Yeltsin made common cause with the
nationalists in other republics, recognizing the right of the Baltic republics
to independence in January 1991, for example, immediately after Soviet
troops had tried to crush the Lithuanian separatists,  and supporting the
Georgians when they rejected Gorbachev’s new federal treaty in March
1991.
It is unlikely that Yeltsin was a genuine Russian nationalist. By 1990
nationalism had become quite widespread at a popular level in the RSFSR,
however, and it was a convenient vehicle for him to use in his election
campaign for the Russian presidency. He established a number of Russian
republican institutions, for example, insisted that Russia should have  sole
control of  its natural resources and industries,  and declared that Russia
would never give up Kaliningrad or the Kurile Islands.8 The nationalist
tone of his pronouncements sowed the first seeds of doubt in the minds of
non-Russians about the willingness of a Russian government to give up
other territories which had formed part of the Russian or Soviet empire.
The  declaration  by  the  Ukrainian  government  of  Ukraine's
sovereignty and independence in  the wake of the coup in August 1991
precipitated a belated understanding by Russians of the consequences of
supporting the separatist aspirations of non-Russians. It seemed (and still
seems) inconceivable to many Russians that Russia and Ukraine should be
divided after 300 years of union. Yeltsin’s response was to threaten that
Russia would unilaterally redraw its borders with republics that withdrew
from  the Union  if  necessary,  so  as  to  incorporate  areas  in  which  the
majority of the population was Russian. Yeltsin’s statement immediately
7 For a discussion of the instrumental use of the ‘Russian idea’ against Gorbachev,
see Steele (1994:  235-248).  The RSFSR became the Russian Federation after the Soviet
Union ceased to exist.
8 While Kaliningrad was not a disputed territory, Japanese demands for the return of
the Kuriles had long prevented Russo-Japanese rapprochement. Yeltsin’s election campaign
coincided with Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo in spring 1991, when there were rumours that the
islands would be returned to Japan in return for economic assistance. For a more detailed
account of Yeltsin’s political platform in 1990 and 1991, see White (1993, Chapter 5).
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aroused fears, particularly in Estonia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan where there
were large Russian minorities across the border, of a resurgent Russian
imperialism.
Russians seemed unaware of these fears. Nor did they understand the
resentment non-Russians felt about Russia. They were convinced that the
economic well-being of the RSFSR had been sacrificed to subsidize the
other, less well-developed republics in the USSR and they did not believe
that elites in the other republics did not know this.9 Once the Soviet Union
had disintegrated in December 1991, Russians also found repugnant the
idea that the 25 million Russians who lived outside the Russian Federation
had now become national minorities. 
The  problem  was  that,  despite  their  dislike  of  the  central  Soviet
government,  most  Russians  found  it  difficult  to  conceive  of  Russia
without an empire. In part this  was because of  the way in  which they
perceived the identity of their state. The historical origins of Russia were
conventionally  traced  to  Kiev  Rus’,  which  made  the  independence of
Ukraine  particularly  painful.10 But  the  problem  was  deeper  than  the
location of Russia’s origin. For Russians the identity of Russia and the
idea of  Russian statehood had always been closely associated with the
Russian  empire.  The  Russian  empire  and  the  Russian  state  developed
simultaneously, and there had never been a Russian nation-state. When the
Tsarist statesman, Sergei Witte, proclaimed that ‘ever since the time of
Peter the Great and Catherine the Great there has been no such thing as
Russia; only a Russian empire’,11 he included, as many Russians today
still  do,  ‘Little  Russians’  (Ukrainians)  and  ‘White  Russians’
(Belorussians)  in  his  depiction  of  the central  Russian  state.  For Witte,
Russia  consisted  of  all  the  Slavs  in  the  country,  while  the  empire
comprised the non-Slav areas which had been colonised by Russia.12
The historic association of statehood with empire is an integral part
of  the  way most  Russians  perceive Russia’s  identity.  Many reformers
found it almost as difficult as the extreme nationalists to accept the loss of
some areas which had previously been part of Russia. At the end of 1991,
therefore, a new identity and a new role had to be found for Russia, and
9 Disputes  about  the distribution of costs  and benefits  between the metropolitan
country and the colonies are common in the aftermath of all empires and they are rarely
resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. More important than the facts and figures, however, is the
absolute conviction of both Russians and non-Russians that they themselves were the losers.
10 Aleksandr  Tsipko,  a  liberal political  philosopher,  argued  that  “without  today’s
Ukraine, there can be no Russia in the old, real sense of the word”, cited in Tolz and Teague
(1992: 7). 
11 Cited in Sergei Maksudov and William Taubman (1991: 26).
12 This is not unique to Russia. It is not uncommon, for example, for English people
to use England and the English people when they mean Britain and the British people.
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Russian  nationalism  was  bound  to  become  more  prominent  in  this
process.  It  was not  just  a  matter  of  accepting that  Russia  had lost  its
empire,  however,  or  of  forging  relationships  with  the  non-Russian
successor states. Russia’s new role in the post-Cold War world proved
problematical. 
A  central  aspect  of  Russia’s  identity  problem  is  the  geopolitical
question raised by the loss of empire. Is Russia part of Europe, or has it
become an Asian or Eurasian power? From a strictly geographical point of
view, it is further from Europe now than it has been for 300 years. A band
of independent countries, most of which are turning their backs on Russia
and facing, or even embracing, Europe, separate it from Europe. For some
Russians,  it  is  imperative  that  Russia  is  European:  heirs  to nineteenth
century Westerners, these ‘Atlanticists’ (as they have been called) equate
progress  and  prosperity  with  Europe.  Others  take  a  more  Slavophile
position,  claiming  that  Russia’s  Eurasian  identity  offers  it  a  unique
‘bridging’ role between East and West. The most extreme proponents of
this view argue that Russia has a special mission in relation to the rest of
the world.  Moreover, since it is neither Western nor Eastern, it can choose
a singular Eurasian ‘third’ path of political and economic development.13
Claims  that  Russia  has  a  distinctive  role  or  a  special  mission  have a
distinctly nationalist undertone.
Apart  from  geographic  considerations,  Russia’s  status  in  the
international system has become an increasingly important aspect of the
problem of Russian identity. Russia is vast, but it is smaller now than it
has been for many centuries except, perhaps, for a brief period during the
Civil  War  from  1918-1920.  Unlike  the  Soviet  Union,  it  is  not  a
superpower and most Russians accept this without any difficulty. But they
find it less easy to accept that its status as a great power is not always
recognized.  There  is  considerable  resentment  that  the  leaders  of  other
countries do not always accord Russia the respect they deem appropriate
to its great power status. The fact that Russia is a great power is reiterated
on every possible occasion14 and much of Russian foreign policy is driven
by the determination to achieve international recognition of great power
status (Pleshakov, 1993: 17-26; and Pozdnyakov, 1993: 3-13). But it is not
just  politicians  who  are  affected  by  Russia’s  diminished  international
status. Many ordinary people experience the loss of superpower status as a
13 The  terms  Atlanticist  and  Eurasian,  which  echo  a  nineteenth  century  dispute
between Slavophiles and Westerners about Russia’s fate, originate from Sergei Stankevich, the
Russian  democrat  who first  voiced  nationalist  disquiet  about  the  future  of  Russia  (see
Nezavisimaya gazeta,  28  March  1992).  His  disquiet  prompted a  prolonged debate about
Russia’s identity. See Malcolm, Pravda, Allison and Light (1996). Stankevich has since fallen
from favour (and is accused of taking bribes).
14 Many statements on foreign policy by President Yeltsin stressed that Russia is a
great power.
54
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT
national  humiliation.  A  sense  of  national  humiliation  can  fuel
nationalism,  impinge on Russia’s relations with the external world and
affect attitudes towards the other nations that formed the Soviet Union
(whose perceived defection caused the diminution in international status).
Russian  post-imperial  identity  problems  and  attitudes  to  non-
Russians are compounded by the effects  of  Soviet historiography. Few
would admit  that they are influenced by Soviet historiography, yet the
surprise  Russians  experienced  when  national  hostility  caused  the  first
violent  conflicts  within  the  Soviet  Union  suggests  that  they  had
internalized Soviet myths about the benefits of empire and the friendship
and  mutual  respect  which  existed  among  the  peoples  of  the  Russian
Empire. Russians believe that, unlike other imperial powers, the Russian
empire  was  benevolent.  One  prominent  political  scientist  argues,  for
example,  that  the  Russian  Empire  aimed  ‘not  to  effect  economic
expansion and not to plunder the peoples of the territories incorporated
into Russia, as was the case with British, French, Spanish and Portuguese
colonisation,  but  to  meet  an  incontestable  necessity...[which]  lay  in
unifying the state, organising it and ensuring its security’ (Pozdnyakov,
1993: 7). 
During the war there was an urgent need to promote unity to ensure a
united stand against Germany. What was required was a Soviet patriotism
which  would  subsume  separate  nationalisms.  The  result  was  the
propagation of a myth about the ‘friendship of the peoples’. According to
the friendship myth, Russians and non-Russians always enjoyed friendly
relations  in  the  Russian  empire.  Historians  depicted the  annexation  of
territory as a response to local demands for union with Russia. Thus the
population of the Caucasus and Central Asia, according to Soviet history,
was  rescued  from  incorporation  into  the  Turkish,  Persian  or  British
empires, while the undeveloped lands of Siberia were settled peacefully by
intrepid  Russian  pioneers.15 These  accounts  of  Russian  imperialism
omitted  any  mention  of  conflict  between  Russians  and  non-Russians.
They also extended the friendship myth to the relationships between non-
Russians: pre-existing historical conflicts were either ignored or depicted
as class struggles rather than as the national or religious disputes that they
often  were.  There  was  no  hint  that  Great  Russian  chauvinism  ever
presented a problem, though it persisted well after the revolution and was
of great concern to Lenin. 
After  1956  some  of  the  historical  distortions  of  Stalinism  were
exposed and corrected. But nationalist leaders or groups that had opposed
the Bolsheviks were not rehabilitated during the period of destalinization




and the friendship myth remained intact (Suny, 1991: 421). The wartime
deportations were blamed on the cult of personality and the deportees, it
was claimed, enjoyed the friendship and assistance of the local population
in their places of  exile (Tillet, 1969:  315-317). When Soviet historians
were invited to contribute to perestroika and undertake the real rewriting
of Soviet history by ‘filling in the blank spots’, they were concerned with
the  recent  past  and  paid  little  attention  to  the  history  of  the  Russian
empire. As a result, it was only when a number of  intractable conflicts
flared up between non-Russians after 1986 that the myth of the friendship
between  non-Russians  was  finally  shattered.  And  the  myth  of  the
friendship  between  Russians  and  non-Russians  could  no  longer  be
sustained when people in the Baltic republics and Georgia appeared to be
prepared to pursue their own independence even at the possible cost of
bringing the whole reform programme to an end. It is fashionable now to
criticise  Western  Sovietologists  for  underestimating  the  force  of
nationalism  within  the  Soviet  Union.  But  Soviet  people  themselves,
whether Russian or non-Russian, were taken aback by the ferocity of the
nationalist fervour which became increasingly evident after 1986. 
The sense of  Russian superiority implicit  in  the Soviet version of
Russian  history  is  still  evident  today in  the  Russian  Federation.  It  is
reflected at a popular level in an endemic and widespread racism which
manifests  itself  as  crude  anti-semitism  and  a  dislike  of  ‘southerners’
(frequently called ‘blacks’). The prevalent belief that the crime, which has
become  so  much  a  part  of  Russian  life,  is  imported  exacerbates  the
perception of Russia as the victim of the other republics. The view that
Russian wealth has been expropriated in the past to subsidise the other
republics is accompanied by a resentment of the perceived ingratitude of
non-Russians. 
Russians are thus curiously ambivalent about non-Russians. On the
one hand, they do not accept responsibility for the behaviour of Russian or
Soviet imperialists. On the other hand, they accuse non-Russians of being
ungrateful for the past benefits they received from Russia and they find it
difficult to adjust to Russia’s more modest identity and role. This often
makes them sound rather belligerent about the ‘near abroad’.16 Yet they
fail to recognize that their ambivalence fuels non-Russian suspicions that
Russia intends to reconstitute the Russian empire.
5. The effect of nationalism on the international relations
of the former Soviet republics 
16 The very term ‘near abroad’, used by Russian analysts to refer to the republics
which were formally part of the USSR, as opposed to the ‘far abroad’, the rest of the world,
encapsulates some of this ambivalence. 
56
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT
Perhaps  the most  surprising  thing  about the demise  of  the Soviet
Union was the peaceful way in which it disintegrated. Although violent
ethnic  conflict  had  occurred  in  Uzbekistan  in  1989,  and  had  been
intractable in Nargorno-Karabagh since 1988 and in Georgia since 1989,
the Soviet Union was dissolved unconstitutionally, but without violence in
1991.17 Nevertheless,  nationalism has played an important role in  their
domestic and international politics and, given the fact that the fifteen new
states  that  were  established  in  1991  are  all  multinational,  it  is  not
surprising that it is potentially a very dangerous force. 
The first  problem in  which  nationalism  played a  role  was in  the
decisions which had to be made regarding citizenship. Some of the new
leaders  (for  example,  in  Ukraine  and  Lithuania)  invoked  a  territorial
principle, granting citizenship to anyone permanently resident within the
borders  of  the  state.  Others,  fearful  that  the  large  minorities  (usually
Russian) living in their countries would dilute the national  culture and
eventually  threaten  the  future  existence  of  the  nation,  adopted  ethnic
criteria to determine automatic citizenship rights. Both Estonia and Latvia,
for example, have imposed difficult residence and language conditions for
non-nationals who apply for citizenship. In the case of Russia, the most
multi-ethnic of the fifteen republics, a territorial principle was adopted.
But the Russian government also offered citizenship to Russians living in
other republics. Russian minorities resident in countries that have adopted
ethnic criteria of citizenship tend, therefore, to have Russian citizenship.
The defence  of  their  rights  and well-being  is  considered to  be  a  vital
national interest of Russian foreign policy.
Whatever principle has been adopted for the purposes of citizenship,
all  the  new governments  have  followed practices  which  have  become
universal  in  new  states:  the  local  language  has  been  adopted  as  the
(usually only) official language and the language used for education; and
steps  have been taken to  ensure  the rapid promotion  into  positions  of
responsibility of people belonging to the majority nation. Since Russian
was the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, people who lived away from
their  putative homelands tended to speak Russian rather than the local
language. Even when Russians and Russian speakers enjoy legal equality
and full civil rights, therefore, they perceive themselves as disadvantaged
minorities.  This  has  led  to  widespread  emigration  from  some  states,
usually  to  the Russian  Federation  and it  is,  in  part,  to  prevent  further
massive emigration that the Russian government extended its undertaking
to  defend  the  rights  and  well-being  of  Russian  nationals  to  Russian
speakers more generally, whether or not they are ethnically Russian. 
17  The presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia, meeting in a country house in
Byelorussia  on  8  December  1991,  simply  declared  the  USSR  no  longer  in  existence,
presenting Gorbachev and the leaders of the other twelve republics with a fait accompli.
57
Margot LIGHT
The defence of the interests of Russians and Russian speakers in the
diaspora is frequently invoked as part of Russian political rhetoric and it
has caused tension between Russia and the other successor states, but it
has  not  been  the  basis  of  policy  so  far.  Nevertheless,  the  frequent
enunciation of this foreign policy goal is perceived as a threat by other
governments. Moreover, if  those Russians who do not migrate identify
themselves more closely with Russia than with the country in which they
live, the potential for conflict within those states, and between them and
Russia, will remain considerable. 
Although an inclusive, territorial principle of citizenship was adopted
in Russia, non-Russian nationalism presents a threat to the integrity of the
Russian  Federation.  In  the case of  Chechnya, which  declared itself  an
independent  country,  attempts  to  suppress  non-Russian  nationalism
brought about an extremely violent and destructive conflict. Although the
war is over, a mutually acceptable solution to Chechnya’s political status
has not been reached. It is ironic that the pretext for the Russian invasion
of Chechnya was the threat it presented to the integrity of the federation.
Yet the ensuing war did more to undermine that cohesion than the de facto
independence  exercised  by  the  Chechen  leaders  in  the  previous  three
years.  The  danger  during  the  war  was  that  the  North  Caucasus,  a
kaleidoscopic  multinational  part  of  the  Russian  Federation,  would  be
destabilised.  That  danger  will  persist  until  all  the  conflicts  in  the
Caucasus, north and south, have been resolved.
Nationalism  presents  other potential  threats to the integrity of  the
Russian  Federation.  In  his  struggle  with  the  first  Russian  parliament,
Yeltsin used non-Russian nationalism in an attempt to defeat the Russian
Supreme Soviet in much the same way that he had used it to defeat the
central  Soviet  government.  In  the  process  he  gave  more  and  more
autonomy to the constituent national republics of the Russian Federation.
Non-national administrative areas, many of them far larger and wealthier
than  the  national  republics,  responded  by  arrogating  more  power  to
themselves. When it became clear that the viability of  the state was in
danger, Yeltsin attempted to strengthen central federal power by proposing
a  new  constitution  which  gave  all  federal  units  the  same  status  and
recentralized the state. The constitution was duly adopted, but the drive for
decentralization  and  a  looser  state  structure  could  not  be  halted.  The
federal government has had to sign separate agreements with each unit
within the federation, ceding variable amounts of autonomy and control
over local economic resources to regional governments. Although this has
alleviated the centrifugal  impetus, the desire of  the periphery for  more
autonomy may continue to undermine the integrity of Russia. 
Nationalism  is  important,  too,  in  the  party  politics  and  electoral
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process in the Russian Federation. Although the pinnacle of the success of
the  extreme  nationalist  parties  appears  to  have  been  reached  in  the
December 1993 parliamentary elections, the consequence of that success
was to make the entire political spectrum adopt more nationalist positions.
Moreover, the spectre of a coalition between nationalists and communists
(the red-brown coalition) continues to haunt reformers within Russia and
their supporters in the outside world.
Although Russian nationalism evokes more fear outside Russia than
non-Russian nationalism, the violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union
have been caused by the latter rather than the former. But these conflicts
affect Russian policy, since they provide a pretext for Russia to intervene
in  the other republics.  Thus Russian peacekeeping forces  are active in
Georgia  (in  both  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia),  in  Moldova  and  in
Tajikistan.18 Moreover, the conflicts have enabled Russia to put pressure
on the governments of other states (for example, Georgia and Armenia) to
permit the establishment of Russian military bases. In the case of Crimea,
the nationalism of the Russians who form the majority of the population
ensure intermittently tense relations between Russia and Ukraine.
Nationalism  also  affects  the relations  of  the former  Soviet  Union
with the outside world. Russian leaders have urged the governments of the
rest  of  the world to  recognize  Russia’s  right  to  keep the peace in  the
former Soviet space. While explicit recognition has not been forthcoming,
other peacekeepers with an international mandate have not been provided.
In  essence,  therefore,  Russia  has  the  tacit  consent  of  the  international
community to continue fulfilling a peacekeeping function, since it is in
everyone’s interests  that the conflicts  should not spread.19 But Russian
peacekeeping  activities  often  appear,  to  non-Russians,  to  herald  a
resurgent Russian imperialism. In response, they put pressure on the West
to  provide security guarantees  and to  curb Russian  expansionism.  The
plans to expand NATO are a consequence of their demands. With respect
to  direct  relations  with  the  ‘far  abroad’,  nationalism  remains  part  of
Russian foreign policy rhetoric but it has not been translated into action.
The  decision  to  expand  NATO eastwards  has  given  a  great  boost  to
Russian nationalists.
It  is  clear  from  these  examples  how  important,  and  potentially
dangerous, nationalism is in the politics and international relations of the
former  Soviet  Union.  Is  this  the  result  of  the  unique  conditions  of
18 It should be noted, however, that the conflict in Tajikistan is a struggle between
clans rather than an inter-ethnic conflict.
19 It should be noted, however, that Russian peacekeeping methods are very different
from those generally applied by the international community. Moreover, non-Russians accuse




democratisation and the transition from socialism in a multiethnic state, or
is the rise of nationalism in the former Soviet Union symptomatic of a
broader problem which will be one of the major challenges of the 21st
century?
6.  The  implications  of  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  the
former Soviet Union for the 21st century
The former Soviet Union is huge, whether one considers landmass or
the size of its population. It is also one of the most multiethnic areas in the
world. Vast numbers of conventional and nuclear arms still  exist in the
former Soviet Union, most of them under conditions of minimal security.
The ethnic disputes that have already occurred appear to be intractable,
even in those cases where there is an uneasy cease-fire or where a peace
treaty has been agreed. There are countless other potential conflicts in the
area (for example, over borders and territory). The consequences of the
transformation  of  a  formerly  tightly  integrated,  centrally  controlled
command economic system into fifteen independent market economies
have been harsh for  the great majority of  the population. For all  these
reasons,  even if  the rise of  nationalism in  the former  Soviet Union  is
unique, it cannot fail to influence the regional and international relations
of Europe. It will continue to constitute a challenge which will have to be
met  into  the  21st  century,  whether  political  leaders  try  to  contain  the
problems, or whether they attempt to resolve them.
The  Soviet  Union  was unique,  of  course,  in  many  ways.  It  is
inconceivable  that  the  identical  conditions  that  led  to  the  collapse  of
socialism and the disintegration of the USSR could be repeated elsewhere.
But  the  rapid change  and economic  dislocation  that  took  place  in  the
former Soviet Union are by no means uncommon, and no matter where
they occur, the political use of nationalism can arouse the kind of popular
fervour which rapidly turns nationalism from a positive means of  self-
identification  to  a  virulent  ethnic  exclusion  of  others  which  leads  to
conflict,  violence  and the committing  of  atrocities  in  the name of  the
nation. 
After  the  Second  World  War  and  until  the  1990s  it  was
conventionally  believed  that  Europeans,  at  least,  and  perhaps  all  the
inhabitants  of  industrialised  countries,  would  never  again  be  the
perpetrators or victims of this kind of nationalism. Events in the former
Soviet  Union  and  the  former  Yugoslavia  have  proved  that  the
conventional wisdom was convenient and comfortable, but incorrect. One
of the greatest challenges of the 21st century, therefore, is to understand,
and accept,  that  we are  none  of  us  immune,  that  we are  all  potential
perpetrators and victims. Massive international efforts have been made in
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the past fifty years to deal with the threat of nuclear war; little thought has
been given, however, as to how to counter nationalism and ethnic hostility.
Another challenge of the 21st century, therefore, is to find the means to
prevent this kind of war, or to end it if it cannot be prevented.
Matryoshka nationalism might be unique to the former Soviet Union.
But  demands  for  autonomy,  for  national  self-determination  and  for
secession  occur  everywhere.  Moreover,  they  are  likely  to  increase  as
economic  interdependence,  the  formation  of  larger  and  larger  trading
blocs  and  political  unions  --  all  those  phenomena  conveniently  called
globalisation -- increase. One of the greatest challenges of the 21st century
will be to devise the means by which ordinary citizens can participate in
meaningful ways in the political and economic decisions that affect them
without threatening the sovereign integrity of the states in which they live,
and ways in which group as well as individual rights and identities can be
exercised and expressed without impinging on the rights and identities of
others. 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  although  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  the
former Soviet space is, to a large extent, the result of the unique conditions
of democratisation and the transition from socialism, the consequences are
both unique and also symptomatic of more general international problems
that will need to be addressed well into the 21st century.
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Özet
Sovyetler Birliği’nde milliyetçilik ve kimlik
Milliyetçilik  bir  ulusun  kimliğini  oluşturmakta  ve  ulus  kurmakta  yararlı  olabilir
ama bir ulusun bütünlüğünü de tehlikeye atabilir. Bu makale eski Sovyetler Birliği’nde
Rus  ve Rus-dışı milliyetçiliğin etkilerine bakmaktadır.  Varılan sonuçlardan biri: Rusya
sınırları  dışında  Rus  milliyetçiliğinin  Rus-dışı  milliyetçiliğinden  daha  fazla  korku
yaratmasına  rağmen,  eski Sovyetler Birliği’ndeki  sert  çatışmalar  daha  ziyade  Rus-dışı
milliyetçilikten kaynaklanmıştır.  Bu tür milliyetçilik aynı zamanda  Rus  Federasyonunu
tehdid etmektedir. Yazara göre, Sovyetler Birliği her ne kadar eşsiz olsada, hızlı değişim
ve  iktisadî  dağılma  ve  bozulmanın  ardından  milliyetçiliğin  siyasî  bir  araç  olarak
kullanılması,  milliyetçiliği  hızla  kimlik  oluşturmak  için  kullanılan  olumlu  bir  araçtan,
çatışmalara yol açan etnik dışlamaya dönüştürebilmektedir.
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